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THE ROLE OF FAMILIARITY IN ILLUSIONS OF PREDICTION 
 
 
 Some researchers have argued that the ability to recall (or the recollection of specific 
details from the past), and the mechanisms involved in doing so, are also used in imagining and 
predicting future events. However, the ability to recall is only one facet of memory ability. 
Another is the ability to detect familiarity with stimuli that relate to previously experienced 
episodes. One might expect that recall is needed to predict future events, as recollection of what 
occurred in the past might enable prediction of what happens next in a current ongoing episode. 
However, research on déjà vu has shown a link between familiarity-detection and illusions of 
prediction and suggests a role of familiarity intensity in these illusions. The purpose of the 
present study was to examine the role of familiarity-detection more generally in illusory feelings 
of prediction and to explore possible mechanisms. Increasing cue familiarity led to a systematic 
increase in prediction confidence despite having little to no effect on prediction accuracy. These 
results did not differ according to whether the decision was past or future oriented. The results 
also did not differ according to whether the future oriented prediction was logically possible or 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Attempting to predict the future is an important human ability. Predicting the future can 
be based on memory for the past and can allow people to make smart decisions and plan 
accordingly. However, even when grounded in memory and experience, predicting the future is 
not easy. A person may have no relevant memories on which to base their predictions, or an 
outcome could be random. Despite the difficulty in predicting the future, a person might still feel 
as though they can predict what will happen in the future. Why might a person feel an illusory 
sense of prediction? In this thesis I investigate one possible cognitive factor: familiarity.  
 There are in fact several recent examples of illusory prediction such as Bear and Bloom 
(2016), who showed that participants can be fooled into thinking that they made predictions they 
never made. Participants were shown a set of white circles and at random, one of the circles 
would turn red. Participants’ job was to predict which circle would change before the change 
occurred. Even when participants did not have enough time to make a prediction, they often 
reported having correctly predicted which circle would change color. Bear et al. (2017) have 
shown that these illusions are linked to delusionality in ways that relate to erroneous timing 
mechanisms in the brain.  
Very recently, Cleary and Claxton (2018) showed that reported déjà vu states are 
associated with illusions of prediction. When people report experiencing déjà vu, they are more 
likely to report feeling like they know what will happen next, even though that is not the case. In 
reality their predictions are not above chance. What might create these illusions of prediction 
during déjà vu? One factor appears to be the perceived familiarity of the event. Cleary et al. 
(2018) have shown that high familiarity intensity is associated with feelings of prediction during 
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déjà vu states. In the present study, I examined whether familiarity-detection more broadly—
beyond the study of déjà vu—can also lead to illusions of prediction, and if so, what the 
underlying mechanisms might be. For example, preliminary data suggests that familiarity can 
lead to illusions of recollection (Huebert et al., 2020). Given the fact that recollecting the past 
and thinking about the future are closely linked (Szpunar et al., 2014), I also compared the effect 
of familiarity-detection on illusions of past recollection to any effect of familiarity-detection on 
feelings of prediction. Specifically, how does the illusion of recollection that is brought on by 
familiarity compare to the possible illusion of prediction?  
Similarity Between Past and Future Thinking 
 Memory obviously has the function of enabling remembrance of past events. However, 
some argue that the real function of memory is to enable thinking about the future (Schacter et 
al., 2007). Schacter et al. argue that similar to how memory is not a replay of the past but 
involves construction of the past, constructing possible future events requires the same ability. 
There is indeed substantial evidence that the ability to remember past events and imagine future 
events are closely linked. This can be seen in a number of different ways. In terms of cognitive 
impairments, Klein et al. (2002) examined how a patient (patient DB) with impairments in 
memory for past events would fair in imagining future events. Patient DB had a great deal of 
trouble remembering past events that were personally relevant. He did not show problems in 
recalling past events not relevant to him. The authors found that patient DB also had trouble 
imagining his own personal experiences in the future. He did not have trouble anticipating 
possible future events less relevant to him. Klein et al. argued that just as the ability to remember 
past events can be divided into episodic (personally relevant) and semantic (not personally 
relevant) events, so can imagining future events.  
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 Similar results have been found with aging. Addis et al. (2008) had older and younger 
participants recall past events in as much detail as possible. Participants were given a noun as a 
cue word and asked to imagine a past event somehow related to the cue word. They were also 
asked to imagine a future event involving the cue word. Responses were also recorded for being 
episodic (personally relevant) or semantic (factual). Addis et al. found that older adults were able 
to construct fewer episodic details about past events than younger participants. The authors also 
found that older adults were able to construct fewer episodic details and more semantic details 
for future events as well. There was also a correlation between the level of past detail and the 
level of future detail. Gaesser et al. (2011) also found similar results using picture cues. Older 
and younger participants were given a picture and asked to describe a possible event that might 
occur in the future that would occur in the general setting of the picture. They found that older 
adults reported fewer imagined details than younger adults. Similar concurrent declines in 
remembering and future thinking have been found with depressed patients. Williams et al. (1996) 
examined badly depressed participants in their ability to remember past events and imagine 
future ones. Participants were given scenarios and responses were scored in terms of how 
specific they were. The authors found that depressed participants were less specific in 
remembering past events as well as future ones. There was also a strong correlation in both 
groups between how specific memories for past events were and how specific imagined future 
events were.  
 Hassabis et al. (2007) have also found similar concurrent declines in past and future 
thinking for certain brain lesions. They compared patients with bilateral hippocampus damage to 
controls on imagining future events. Participants were shown a cue and instructed to imagine a 
new event and give a description of the event. They were scored on the overall richness of the 
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imagined event. Those with hippocampus damage showed a sharp decline in detail for the 
imagined event. Hassabis et al. argued that impairment to retrieval of specific memories is likely 
not simply responsible for trouble with imagining a future event. In other words, it is not the case 
that participants cannot imagine future events in more detail simply because they recall less past 
detail on which to rely. One reason is that participants were instructed to not use any actual 
memories. They also used commonplace cues with the goal of having participants use 
generalized semantic representations rather than specific episodic memories in the construction 
of an imagined event. Lastly, one participant with hippocampus damage did not show 
impairment in episodic retrieval prior to the experiment, yet still showed the predicted problem 
imagining future events.  
 Evidence of the overlap between remembering past events and imagining future ones can 
also be found in the neural correlates of healthy patients. Addis et al. (2007) have found similar 
FMRI activation between recalling the past and imagining the future. Participants were shown a 
noun as a cue and asked to construct a past event or future event related to the cue. They were 
then asked to elaborate on the event as much as they could. Addis et al. found some different 
activation for the initial construction of the event. Namely, the left hippocampus activated for 
both construction of a past event and imagining a future one. However, the right hippocampus 
was mostly engaged in future event construction and not past event construction. During the 
elaboration phase almost all areas shared activation for both tasks, including both sides of the 
hippocampus. Furthermore, Szpunar et al. (2007) also found similar activation for remembering 
and imagining a future event. Participants were given a cue word such as birthday and asked to 
either imagine reliving a related event or imagine themselves in a related future event. In another 
condition participants were asked to imagine Bill Clinton doing something related to the cue 
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word. This was done to examine activity for non-personally relevant events. Some areas did 
show more activity for future events, namely areas involved in motor control. However, many 
areas (including the bilateral parahippocampal gyrus) showed indistinguishable activation for 
past events and future events. There was also less activation for imagining Bill Clinton than 
imagining oneself doing something.  
 Why then are memory and future thinking closely linked? Many have argued that the 
ability to retrieve and flexibly use memories allows simulation of possible future events 
(Schacter, Addis, & Szpunar, 2017, Schacter, Benoit, & Szpunar, 2017). However, other than 
comparing semantic and episodic memory (Addis et al., 2008), little research has examined 
exactly what kinds of memory are involved in thinking about the future, and more specifically, in 
ways that enable people to think about predicting or anticipating future events or outcomes. 
Szpunar et al. (2014) discuss prediction as one form of future thinking. For example, a person 
might predict that a company will do well by merging with another. However, this type of 
prediction might require recollection of some specific details of past events. The person thinking 
about the companies merging might need to recall specific details of past events that suggest the 
merger would succeed. This, along with the studies of hippocampal involvement in imagining 
future events, suggests that recall processes are involved in prediction (Hassabis et al., 2007). 
However, there is another type of memory that can occur in the absence of recall—familiarity-
detection. In contrast to recall, or calling specific information to mind, familiarity-detection 
involves simply having a feeling about a current situation, that it somehow relates to something 





Familiarity-Detection in the Laboratory 
 Research on familiarity-detection largely stems from the study of recognition memory. 
Recognition memory, which itself has been studied for over 50 years, is the ability to 
discriminate recently studied from non-recently-studied items on tests given using list-learning 
paradigms. A major theoretical approach to recognition memory, known as dual-process theory, 
holds that it can be broken into two underlying bases: recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 
2002). A real-life example of recollection would be encountering someone on the bus and 
remembering that the person works at the butcher shop. In the laboratory, recollection-based 
recognition would occur when recognizing that a test item was studied on an earlier study list by 
recalling the exact instance in which it was presented (e.g., remembering the thoughts 
accompanying the word’s presentation when it appeared, what the word looked like on the 
screen, etc.). In contrast, familiarity is simply a feeling that a stimulus has been encountered 
before, but without remembering when or where that stimulus was encountered. A real-life 
example would be recognizing a person’s face as having been seen before without being able to 
recall anything specific about where or when the person was seen before. In the lab, familiarity-
based recognition occurs when the participant recognizes a test item as familiar without 
recollecting any specifics about its study list presentation (Mandler, 2008; see Yonelinas for a 
review).  
 There are a number of ways to dissociate familiarity and recollection-based decisions. 
The most common is the remember-know procedure (Gardiner et al., 2002). In this procedure 
participants indicate whether each test item is simply familiar (know), or they remember seeing it 
in context (remember). For example, if a participant remembers seeing an item as the first word 
studied, the participant would make a remember judgment. If the item just feels familiar the 
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participant would make a know judgment. A number of dissociations have been found between 
remembering and knowing. These dissociations are taken as evidence that recollection and 
familiarity are unique processes. For example, Yonelinas (2001) used the remember know 
procedure and found that dividing attention during the study phase produced a decline in 
remember responses but had negligible effects on know responses. Participants also studied 
words in a more conceptual manner (rate the pleasantness of each word) or perceptual (count the 
number of syllables in each word). Conceptual processing had much larger effects on remember 
responses than know responses. From these results Yonelinas also argued that familiarity is a 
continuous signal detection process that occurs quickly and without effort, whereas recollection 
is a threshold like process that is slower and requires conscious effort. Familiarity is also a 
quantitative process where it is felt in different levels of strength, whereas recollection involves 
the retrieval of qualitative details of the studied event. 
 Another method of measuring recollection is to test source memory (Yonelinas, 1999, 
Johnson et al., 1993). In a typical source memory paradigm, stimuli are studied, and memory for 
context is tested. For example, words are heard in either a male or female voice. At test the 
participant is presented with studied and not studied words. The participant must then decide if 
the word is old or new, and then decide if it was presented in a male or female voice. Similar 
versions include trying to remember the background color of the word, or where on the screen 
the word appeared. In the butcher on the bus example recollection is trying to remember the 
context of when or where the person was encountered, just like how in a source memory task a 
person is trying to remember the context of what the background color was. Yonelinas argued 
that familiarity is only useful in discriminating sources for certain tasks. For example, when 
deciding whether a word was studied in a more recent list, Yonelinas suggested that familiarity 
8 
 
can contribute because more recent items will feel more familiar. In remembering the 
background color of a word, familiarity is not helpful since both sources are (or at least should 
be) equal in familiarity. Instead a participant must rely on recollection to discriminate between 
sources.  
 Another measure of familiarity is recognition without identification (Cleary & Greene, 
2000). In this procedure participants study a list of words (e.g., craft) and are given word 
fragments at test. Half of the test words are fragments of studied words (e.g., c___t) while some 
are fragments of unstudied words (e.g., f___t). Participants first try to complete the fragment and 
then they rate how certain they are that the word that completes the fragment was studied. Even 
when participants are unable to complete the fragment, they still give higher ratings to fragments 
that correspond to a studied word.  
 Cleary and Greene (2001) have argued that recognition without identification reflects 
familiarity instead of recollection. To test this participants completed either the standard 
recognition without identification task, or an associative recognition test. In the associative 
recognition test a participant would study word pairs and at test would first see word fragments 
and try to complete them. The participant would then be shown another word and asked the 
likelihood that the first word was studied with it. Memory for whether a word was studied with 
another word is a type of contextual memory. Thus, it is thought to reflect recollection 
(Yonelinas, 1997). As before, even when failing to identify a word, fragments from studied 
words still showed higher recognition ratings than those that were fragments of new words. 
During identification failure associative ratings showed a smaller effect than old new status. This 
supports the notion that recognition without identification reflects familiarity, since associative 
recognition is thought to rely less on familiarity and more on recollection. 
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 Further evidence that recognition without identification reflects familiarity can be found 
in different effects of encoding. Levels of processing (encoding words via meaning vs perceptual 
features) can affect remember and know judgments differently (Yonelinas, 2001). These two 
methods of encoding also have different effects on recognition without identification versus 
recognition with identification. Cleary (2002) found that encoding words in terms of meaning 
had an effect on completing word fragments and recognition with identification but had no effect 
on recognition without identification. The same results were found when participants rated words 
in terms of self-relevance instead of counting vowels, which was another way of manipulating 
levels of processing.  
 Another way to separate familiarity from recollection is the recognition without cued 
recall paradigm (Cleary, 2004). In this paradigm, participants are shown study words and at test 
are shown certain types of cues that either resemble a studied word or do not resemble a studied 
word. They are first asked to recall the study word that the cue is similar to. Then they are asked 
to rate how certain they are that a similar word appeared at study. Of particular interest are the 
ratings given when participants are unable to recall the cued study word. Participants will still 
rate the test cue higher if it resembles a study word than if it does not. This resemblance can be 
based on several dimensions. Experiment 1 examined this for orthographically similar cues. For 
example, studying the word cheetah and being tested on the word cheetohs. Experiment 2 used 
the same approach, but study words were heard instead of being seen. Experiment 3 examined 
the role of phonology (since cheetah and cheetohs both look and sound similar) by using words 
that sounded similar but did not look similar (e.g., raft and laughed). Lastly, Experiment 4 used 
semantic similarity such as studying the word cheetah then being tested on the word jaguar. All 
four experiments showed similar results. Even when participants are unable to use the cue to 
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recall the studied word, they still give higher ratings to cues that resemble a studied word in 
some way. This overlap in features can be orthographic, phonological, or semantic. Cleary 
argued that recognition without cued recall can be interpreted as a dual process similar to 
remember know. If a participant shows successful cued recall this is thought to reflect 
recollection. When cued recall fails but the cue is recognized this is thought to reflect familiarity 
in the absence of recollection.  
 The various types of recognition without identification or recognition without cued recall 
are rooted in the global matching models of recognition (Clark & Gronlund, 1996). Under these 
models the individual features of a test item are matched with all features in memory to produce 
a familiarity signal that will be greater or lesser, depending on the degree of feature match 
between the test item and all of the items stored in memory. Therefore, recognition without 
identification and recognition without cued recall can be explained as occurring because a 
fragment (Cleary & Greene, 2000) or a feature-overlapping cue (Cleary, 2004) corresponding to 
a studied word has more overlapping features with a studied word than does a new word. As a 
result, even when identification or cued recall fails those fragments and cues that correspond to 
studied words still feel familiar and will be more familiar with greater degrees of feature overlap 
with studied information.  
 Ryals and Cleary (2012) have shown dissociations suggesting that recognition without 
cued recall is consistent with the dual process models of recognition (Yonelinas, 2002). Just like 
with remember know, if recognition with and without cued recall are unique processes, then 
certain manipulations should show effects on one and not the other. The authors first examined 
how the concreteness of the word would affect the two processes. They argued that concreteness 
tends to affect recall (or recollection) and not familiarity. The authors found that concrete words 
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did increase cued recall but did not increase recognition without cued recall. In a second 
experiment, the authors manipulated the emotionality of the words. They again found an increase 
in cued recall but not in recognition without cued recall. 
 In a third experiment Ryals and Cleary (2012) showed another dissociation, one that had 
a larger effect on recognition without cued recall than recognition with cued recall. Under global 
matching models (Clark & Gronlund, 1996) a word is matched on all features in memory, not 
just ones that correspond to a single trace. Therefore, if a cue resembles multiple studied words 
then it should feel more familiar than if it resembles one or no studied words. To test this Ryals 
and Cleary had participants study words, some of which shared features with three other study 
words (e.g., pitchfork, patchwork, pocketbook, pullcork) and some of which were unique on the 
study list (e.g., spells). Participants later received a test list containing structurally similar non-
words that resembled either four studied feature-overlapping words (e.g., potchbork), one studied 
word (e.g., stells), or no studied words (e.g., neast). As before participants attempted to recall the 
corresponding studied target word(s) and also rated the familiarity of the test cue itself. Ryals 
and Cleary found that higher feature overlap led to higher familiarity when recall failed. 
Recognition ratings for successful recall were affected by overlap, but less so than when recall 
failed. If recognition with cued recall and without cued recall are just stronger and weaker 
versions of the same process, then this interaction would not be expected, supporting the idea 
that recognition without cued recall is based on familiarity-detection that itself results from a 
feature-matching process. 
 This dissociation has also been observed for semantic feature matching (Cleary, Ryals, & 
Wagner, 2015). Participants were tested on cues (e.g., cedar) that semantically related to either 4 
studied words (birch, oak, pine, willow), or two studied words (birch, oak), or no studied words. 
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The results were smaller but overall showed the same pattern as Ryals and Cleary (2012). 
Increasing semantic overlap increased familiarity when recall failed, and this effect was larger 
than when recall succeeded.  
 Ryals, Cleary, and Seger (2013) have found distinct neural signatures for recognition 
with and without cued recall. They found that the hippocampus showed increased activation for 
successful over failed recall. Other areas such as the perirhinal cortex showed increased 
activation for matching over novel cues. This also supports the notion that recognition with and 
without cued recall are unique processes since they are showing different neural activation.   
 Returning to my central question, can this sense of familiarity without recall create 
feelings of prediction? Consider the following example: imagine a person walking down the 
street and seeing a truck approaching a stop sign. What might lead a person to believe that he or 
she can predict where the truck will turn? One possibility is that the person recollects seeing the 
truck on this street before. The person might also recollect that the last time the truck was on this 
street it turned left. Not surprisingly, this might lead the person to feel confident that the truck 
will turn left. However, what if instead the person cannot recollect any details about the truck in 
question, including where the truck turned last time, or even that it had previously been 
encountered on that street? Instead, the truck just feels familiar, and the person infers from this 
that he or she has seen the truck before. Would the person still feel more confident that he or she 
can predict where the truck will turn? It might seem that this sense of familiarity would not be 
involved in feelings of prediction. Yet, the research on déjà vu discussed next suggests that a 
person might think that he or she has a higher chance of predicting something when there is a 




Déjà Vu and Feelings of Prediction 
 Déjà vu is the feeling that something has been encountered before, despite knowledge 
that it must be new (Brown, 2004). Cleary et al. (2009) and Cleary et al. (2012) have argued that 
déjà vu results from an overlap in features just as familiarity does and may even result from a 
special instance of the same familiarity process being tapped in recognition without cued recall 
paradigms. Using a variation of the recognition without cued recall procedure (Cleary, 2004), the 
authors were able to recreate déjà vu in the laboratory. Participants studied black and white line 
drawings of scenes and were later tested on structurally similar scenes and completely novel 
scenes. The similar scenes had the same shape and layout but had different objects than the 
studied scenes (see Figure 27 in appendix). Cleary et al. had participants try to recall the 
structurally similar scene and focused on trials when recall failed. The authors found that the 
probability of reporting déjà vu was higher for scenes that resembled studied scenes than for 
those that did not. Similar results have been found using virtual reality. Cleary et al. (2012) used 
a similar procedure as the above article, but instead used virtual reality. The key finding was that 
on trials where recall of the studied scene failed, déjà vu was more likely to occur for scenes that 
resembled a previous scene than those that did not and was even more likely in instances of 
greater feature overlap between the test scene and the earlier-viewed scene in question.  
 Déjà vu has also been shown to be associated with feelings of prediction. Survey reports 
have suggested an association between déjà vu and feelings of prediction (Brown, 2004), while 
Cleary and Claxton (2018) have documented this effect in the laboratory. Cleary and Claxton 
had participants move through a virtual environment at study. As in previous work, half of the 
test scenes mapped onto study scenes while half did not. In the structurally similar scenes at test, 
the camera stopped short of where a turn had occurred in the structurally similar study scene. 
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Participants had to indicate if they felt that they could predict the direction of the turn, as well as 
if they were experiencing déjà vu. Not surprisingly, when recall succeeded, participants were 
able to predict the direction of the next turn at above chance levels. Interestingly, however, 
Cleary and Claxton found that participants did not have any actual prediction ability (they were 
at chance level) when recall failed, yet despite this, participants were more likely to indicate a 
feeling of prediction when in a déjà vu state.  
 One consistent finding is the strong relationship between déjà vu and familiarity. Cleary 
et al. (2009) have shown that feelings of familiarity are high among déjà vu states, and that 
structural similarity increases both feelings of familiarity and déjà vu. Cleary et al. (2012) have 
also shown that high familiarity follows similar patterns as déjà vu. Specifically, that when a 
scene maps onto a studied scene, déjà vu is more likely and familiarity ratings are higher. In a 
second experiment, Cleary et al. examined familiarity and déjà vu for scenes that were identical 
to studied scenes but that were incorrectly labeled as new, as well as structurally similar 
unidentified scenes, and novel scenes. A similar relation was found where identical scenes that 
were labeled as new received both the highest familiarity ratings and the highest probability of 
déjà vu states. As in the first experiment, structurally similar unidentified scenes were next in 
both déjà vu and familiarity, followed by novel scenes. Given that déjà vu is associated with 
feelings of prediction (Cleary & Claxton, 2018) and déjà vu is related to familiarity, then 
familiarity may also be related to feelings of prediction. Cleary and Claxton also found that 
structurally similar scenes increased familiarity, déjà vu, and feelings of prediction each in 
similar fashion.  
 Cleary et al. (2018) have more directly tested the links between familiarity, déjà vu, and 
feelings of prediction. Using a yes/no indication of familiarity, participants were more likely to 
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report a feeling of familiarity when in a déjà vu state. Among déjà vu states, those that came with 
feelings of prediction were also associated with a higher tendency to report a feeling of 
familiarity. When familiarity was reported, participants also reported on the intensity of the 
feeling of familiarity. Cleary et al. found that among familiar scenes, déjà vu states with feelings 
of prediction felt the most familiar, followed by déjà vu states without feelings of prediction, 
followed by non-déjà vu states. Lastly, regardless of déjà vu, feelings of prediction were 
associated with more familiarity reports and higher familiarity intensity than scenes that did not 
produce feelings of prediction. In short there is a strong association between familiarity, déjà vu, 
and feelings of prediction. This suggests the possibility that feelings of familiarity outside of déjà 
vu are associated with feelings of prediction.  
 Note that Cleary and Claxton’s (2018) finding that when recall succeeded, prediction was 
above chance, is analogous to when a person can recollect where the truck turned last time the 
person would actually have some ability to predict where it will turn in the future. When recall 
failed, Cleary and Claxton found no predictive ability, but despite that, participants often 
wrongly thought they could predict the turn when experiencing déjà vu. Cleary et al. (2018) 
showed that familiarity seems to be at the heart of this prediction illusion. Thus, while familiarity 
might not help with prediction it could be the case that familiarity makes people more confident 
that they can predict a future event. In the truck example, a high sense of familiarity could lead 
participants to falsely think they can predict where the truck will turn.  
Illusions of Prediction and Illusions of Recollection 
 If familiarity can drive illusions of prediction (Cleary et al., 2018), and past and future 
thinking are closely linked (Szpunar et al., 2014), then can familiarity drive illusions of past 
recollection? Preliminary data from our lab (Huebert et al., 2020) suggests that there may be 
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some commonality between illusions of past occurrence and illusions of future prediction. In one 
experiment participants studied words that came with an arrow pointing left or right. This 
background arrow was included to examine recollection confidence and accuracy, with the logic 
being that correctly identifying the direction of the arrow requires recollection of it 
accompanying the word at study.  Part of the logic here is that source memory tests involve 
recalling an aspect of the context of a presented item (Yonelinas, 1999), and the arrow in this 
case represents a form of context.  
  As in Ryals and Cleary (2012) each test cue (e.g., potchbork) mapped onto either four 
studied words (e.g., pitchfork, patchwork, pocketbook, pullcork), one studied word (pitchfork), 
or no studied words. This was done to manipulate familiarity in the absence of recall. 
Participants first rated the familiarity intensity of the cue. Next, participants indicated their 
confidence in knowing the direction of the arrow. They then indicated whether they thought the 
arrow was left or right. Lastly, participants attempted to recall a studied word that resembled the 
test cue. Participants made each of these judgments for each test cue.  
 Huebert et al. (2020) only examined trials where recall failed. This was done to try to 
isolate familiarity-based decisions. As was discussed earlier, Ryals and Cleary (2012) found 
evidence that recognition in the absence of recall reflects familiarity. In addition to replicating 
the results by Ryals and Cleary, Huebert et al. also found that cue overlap increased participants’ 
confidence in knowing the direction of the arrow. However, during recall failure, participants 
were actually not above chance at selecting the correct direction of the arrow. The authors argued 
that when participants feel a sense of familiarity, they assume that some level of recollection is 
also present. These results are analogous to what Cleary and Claxton (2018) found for prediction 
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ability; familiarity appears to have led participants to be more confident in their recollective 
ability when in reality, they were not above chance. 
 Huebert et al. (2020) used similar paradigms in Experiments 2 and 3. In Experiment 2 
participants studied words on a green or blue background instead of with a background arrow. 
Participants rated their confidence in recollecting the background color and tried to recollect the 
color. In Experiment 3 each word came with a high or low-pitched sound. Participants indicated 
their confidence in recollecting the background sound and tried to recollect it. Just as with the 
background arrow in Experiment 1, the color or background sound was a source memory task to 
examine recollection confidence and accuracy. Experiments 2 and 3 showed the same results as 
Experiment 1; that increasing cue overlap increased recollection confidence (background color 
or sound) but not recollection accuracy.  
 From the example of the truck earlier, in conjunction with the findings of Cleary and 
Claxton (2018), who found that the ability to recollect specifics enabled above-chance prediction 
whereas mere feelings of déjà vu only led to illusory feelings of prediction, it might seem that 
recollection is required to make predictions. However, remember that thinking about the future is 
a key ability of memory. Thus, if familiarity can create illusions of recollection as in Huebert et 
al. (2020), is it possible that familiarity could create similar illusions of prediction? Similarly, 
another goal of this thesis was to compare the effects of familiarity on recollection versus 
prediction confidence.  
Familiarity Use in Past and Future Judgments 
  While familiarity seems to create illusions of recollection (Huebert et al., 2020), and 
familiarity is linked with illusions of prediction (Cleary et al., 2018), some evidence suggests 
that there are at least some cases in which familiarity is used differently for past and future 
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judgments. In other words, there are situations in which participants decide to differentially rely 
on perceived familiarity versus other information. In one examination of judgments about the 
future, Nomi and Cleary (2012) compared recognition without identification for scenes to 
feelings of knowing. In contrast to familiarity ratings given in recognition without identification 
paradigms (which are past-oriented), feelings of knowing are future-oriented, such as when 
participants rate the likelihood that they will recognize a test word on a future test. Participants 
were shown a list of names of famous places, then later shown pictures of those places or new 
places. When a picture could not be named, old scenes were rated as more familiar than new 
scenes. In the feeling of knowing condition, participants were asked to indicate how likely they 
thought it was that they would recognize the name on a later recognition test. Surprisingly, the 
opposite of the standard recognition without identification effect (higher familiarity ratings for 
scenes whose name had been studied, even when the name could not be stated) was found for 
feelings of knowing. Participants gave lower ratings of feelings of knowing for pictures of 
unnamed places whose names were studied than unnamed places whose names were not studied. 
Nomi and Cleary argued that recognition without identification relies on familiarity whereas 
feelings of knowing might rely on accessibility to idiosyncratic partial information. Studied 
scenes may have been primed to be identified more often, whereas unstudied words would more 
often contain partial identification that would have been pushed to full identification if they had 
been studied. Non-studied items did in fact show more partial retrieval than studied items. This 
partial access might have led participants to believe they would recognize the item later, since 
they were relying on accessibility instead of familiarity.  
 In contrast to the above findings, Cleary (2015) did show that people will use familiarity 
to guide future-oriented decisions, but not to the same extent as in past-oriented decisions. Cleary 
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suggested that the tasks described above might have produced more partial access than the 
recognition without cued recall paradigm. In the recognition without cued recall paradigm 
participants should not have more partial access for unstudied words. Using the same procedure 
as Ryals and Cleary (2012), participants either made the same past judgment (a familiarity 
rating) or a future judgment (a feeling of knowing rating). Increasing familiarity caused 
participants to increasingly believe that they would recognize the item on a later test; in other 
words, it increased their future-oriented feelings of knowing judgments. However, this effect was 
smaller for feelings of knowing judgments than the past-oriented familiarity ratings used to show 
recognition without cued recall. The rate of increase with increasing test cue familiarity was 
greater for past-oriented than for future-oriented judgments. Cleary suggested that future-
oriented judgments like rating feelings of knowing may rely on other processes and cue 
familiarity is only one of them, while past-oriented judgments are based more heavily in cue 
familiarity.  
To the point of the present research, if familiarity itself is used to make future-oriented 
judgments, then it is possible that familiarity by itself can lead to illusions of prediction.  
However, given that familiarity seems to be used differently for future-oriented feelings of 
knowing judgments than past-oriented recognition judgments, I also compared the effect of cue 
familiarity on feelings of past recollection versus on feelings of prediction. It is unknown 
whether familiarity could have equivalent or different effects on feelings of recollection and 
feelings of prediction.  
The Present Study  
 In short, recollection of specific details might be needed to actually predict the future 
(Cleary & Claxton, 2018; Schacter et al., 2007). However, familiarity is associated with illusions 
20 
 
of prediction during déjà vu (Cleary et al., 2018). Familiarity also creates illusions of recollection 
(Huebert et al., 2020). Familiarity also has been shown to be used to make future-oriented 
judgments insofar as participants use it to gauge the likelihood of future recognition of currently 
inaccessible target knowledge, even if not to the same degree that they use it to gauge the 
likelihood of past occurrence (Cleary, 2015). The goal of the current experiments was to examine 
the effects of familiarity-detection on feelings of prediction using a standard memory paradigm 
(as opposed to a déjà vu paradigm).  
Another goal of the present study was to determine if familiarity creates illusions of 
prediction that are equivalent, greater than, or less than illusions of recollection (as in Huebert et 
al., 2020). It could be the case that familiarity has a similar effect on feelings of recollection and 
feelings of prediction. Given Cleary’s (2015) finding that familiarity has a smaller influence on 
future-oriented feelings of knowing than on past-oriented feelings of recognition, it could also be 
the case that feelings of prediction (which are future-oriented) are less influenced by familiarity 
than are feelings of recollection (which are past-oriented). However, given Cleary et al.’s (2018) 
finding that high familiarity intensity was associated with feelings of prediction in their déjà vu 
study, it is also possible that familiarity is strongly associated with feelings of prediction, 
possibly more so than with feelings of past recollection. Huebert et al. showed fairly small 
effects of familiarity on feelings of recollection. This difference could be due to major 
methodological differences between standard recognition without cued recall paradigms and déjà 
vu paradigms. However, it is possible that participants are more likely to use familiarity to infer 
prediction than to infer recollection. 
 Another goal of this thesis was to examine whether familiarity-based illusions are 
comparable across not only past-oriented illusions of recollection and future-oriented illusions of 
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prediction, but also if they differ when future-oriented illusions of prediction are more versus 
less rational in nature. Returning to the truck example, if one had only seen the truck parked 
somewhere before, but had not seen it turn, would the familiarity with the truck still lead to 
feelings of prediction? In this example, a person might not feel as though he or she can predict 
the turn based on either recollection of specific details or a sense of familiarity. Yet there is still 
reason to believe a person would indicate feelings of prediction. In déjà vu reports participants 
believe the place is new, yet still report feelings of prediction (Brown, 2004), and even in cases 
where participants show no actual predictive ability, they still feel that they can predict during 
reported déjà vu states (Cleary & Claxton, 2018). Our own preliminary studies on tip of the 
tongue state biases have shown that participants feel that they can predict completely random 
events like a coinflip (Shock et al., 2018). It could be the case that feelings of familiarity 
similarly drive participants to feel that they can predict completely random events. Therefore, in 
the present study, I examined three judgments: Judgments of recollection (a past-oriented 
decision), judgments of logically-based prediction (a future-oriented judgment that is 
theoretically possible to predict based on the past), and irrational prediction (a future-oriented 
judgment that is impossible to predict based on the past). I used three variations of the procedure 
by Huebert et al. (2020). Specifically, the first condition of Experiment 1 was a replication of the 
background color recollection task used in Experiment 1 by Huebert et al. but with two 
additional conditions added in a between-subjects comparison. In the second condition, 
participants performed the same task but instead of a past-oriented feeling of recollection 
judgment, participants gave future-oriented feelings of prediction judgments that were based in 
past experience (and thus not irrational). In the third condition, participants gave future-oriented 
feelings of prediction judgments that were more irrational in nature, as it was theoretically an 
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objectively unpredictable event. Experiment 2 was a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 but 
was based off of the sound source memory task used by Huebert et al. in Experiment 3. In short, 
Experiment 2 was an auditory analog to the visual Experiment 1.  
  Answering these questions will be important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it would 
enable beginning to examine the role of familiarity in decisions other than recognition memory. 
As was discussed earlier, recognition memory is usually examined in terms of recollection and 
familiarity. However, familiarity and feelings of prediction have never been examined outside of 
déjà vu, and even that is new work (Cleary et al., 2018). The current research will begin to 
extend an aspect of the recognition memory literature to feelings of prediction; specifically, the 
role of familiarity (as a memory process) in cognitive biases used in decision-making. Secondly, 
it would help to expand the knowledge of feelings of prediction. Prediction has typically been 
examined in the context of actual ability and how it applies to human decision making (e.g., 
Herdener et al., 2016), or the subjective probability of an outcome (e.g., Carroll, 1978). 
Predictions have been examined in terms of how people overestimate having made a conscious 
prediction beforehand (Bear & Bloom, 2016, Bear et al., 2017). Outside of the research on déjà 
vu, no research has examined illusory prediction confidence and the role of familiarity (Cleary et 
al., 2018). 
 The current research will also provide further evidence of the explanation put forth by 
Cleary et al. (2018). The association between déjà vu and feelings of prediction is correlational 
and has not been examined outside the realm of déjà vu. The current study could provide 
experimental evidence of familiarity creating feelings of prediction.  
 Lastly, the current research could further inform how familiarity is used for past versus 
future judgments. Cleary (2015) found that familiarity was less utilized for feelings of knowing 
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than past exposure. Nothing is known about the role of familiarity for feeling of recollection 
versus feelings of prediction and feelings of irrational prediction. 
 Experiment 1investigated these questions using a background color recollection task 
(participants had to indicate their confidence in recollecting a background color) or a background 
prediction task (participants had to try to predict the upcoming background color). Experiment 2 
was a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 and was the same except that it involved a different 

































CHAPTER 2 – EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
 Experiment 1 examined  how different levels of familiarity in the absence of recall 
influence illusions of recollection, logically based prediction, and irrational prediction using 
three variations of the procedure by Huebert et al. (2020).  
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and fourteen participants completed Experiment 1. Using G power (Faul et 
al., 2007), and based on the effect sizes of Huebert et al. (2020) and Cleary (2015), I determined 
that 90 participants would result in sufficient statistical power (see power analysis in appendix 
for further detail). However, due to unexpected sign ups and cut off dates that number was 
exceeded in Experiment 1. Participants were undergraduates from Colorado State University and 
received course credit for participating. They were  male and female and mostly in their late 
teens to early twenties. 
Design 
  Experiment 1 used a three (cue overlap; high overlap, low overlap, or no overlap) by 
three (judgment type; recollection, logically based prediction, irrational prediction) mixed 
design. Cue overlap was  manipulated within subjects and consisted of high overlap (test word 
resembled four studied words), low overlap (test word resembled one studied word), or no 
overlap (test word resembled no studied words). Judgment type (recollection, logically based 
prediction, irrational prediction) was manipulated between subjects. In the recollection condition 
participants indicated their confidence in recollecting the background color of the studied word 
corresponding to the current test cue. In the logically based prediction condition participants 
indicated their confidence in predicting the upcoming background color based on the background 
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color of the studied word. The irrational prediction condition was similar to the logically based 
prediction condition except that studied words did not have any background color. Therefore, 
there was no plausible way to predict the background color, and any feelings of prediction would 
be irrational. 
Materials 
 Materials were taken from Ryals and Cleary (2012) and Huebert et al. (2020). Four study 
and test blocks were made from 96 cue and target sets. The full study and test materials are 
shown in the appendix. Each set contains a non-word test cue (e.g., POTCHBORK) and four 
possible study words (e.g., PATCHWORK, PITCHFORK, PULLCORK, POCKETBOOK). 
Recall that according to global matching models (Clark & Gronlund, 1996) familiarity arises 
from the amount of overlap in features between a test item’s features and all features in memory. 
Based on global matching models Ryals and Cleary found that overlapping features with several 
items creates a stronger familiarity signal than overlap with only one item. Thus, it should 
produce a stronger familiarity signal than a cue that only resembles one study word. 
Furthermore, a cue that does not overlap with any studied words should feel less familiar than a 
cue resembling one study word. In short, since familiarity arises through feature overlap (Clark 
and Gronlund, 1996), manipulating overlap level served as my manipulation of familiarity.   
 While many types of features can give rise to familiarity (Cleary, 2004), Ryals and 
Cleary (2012) focused on letter overlap. In the above example POTCHBORK has letter overlap 
with four study items. The materials were counterbalanced so that each cue appeared equally 
often in all three overlap conditions. So, in one version POTCHBORK overlapped with four 
study words. In another version POTCHBORK overlapped with only one study word and a 
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different cue overlapped with four study words. In another version POTCHBORK did not 
overlap with any study words.  
 As in Ryals and Cleary (2012) test cues from a set almost always had the same first and 
last letter since they are weighted more heavily (see Grainger & Whitney, 2004). The number of 
letters were not always the same between similar studied words. Since cues and targets 
sometimes were different lengths, Ryals and Cleary (2012) counted from the first letter to the 
middle letter and from the back letter to the middle letter to examine how many letters 
overlapped. Each cue had some letters that were in the same location as each of the four possible 
study words. For example, POTCHBORK is one letter less than POCKETBOOK but they both 
have matching letters P,O,B,O,K.  Each study-test block contained 40 study words and 24 test 
cues.    
Procedure 
 Before beginning the experiment, participants saw:  
 In this experiment, you are going to view a list of words on the computer. The words will 
 flash by, one at a time in the upper left-hand corner of the screen. You should try your 
 best to remember each word for a later test. The test will be explained to you when you 
 get to it. Altogether there will be 4 study-test blocks in this experiment.  
 
In each block participants studied 40 words during the study phase. In the study blocks each 
word was shown one at a time for two seconds with a one second pause between words. In the 
recollection and logically based prediction conditions, each study word was presented in white 
on a blue or green background. Half of the words appeared on a green background and half on a 
blue background. This source memory task was included to assess recollection. As was discussed 
earlier, since both sources (green and blue) should be equally familiar recollection should be 
required to remember them (Yonelinas, 1999). However, in the irrational prediction condition 
each study word appeared in white on a grey background. Thus, when it later came to the test 
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phase any feelings of prediction would be irrational since unlike the logically based prediction 
condition, there was nothing to base the prediction on. After the study phase of a block, 
participants saw:  
 Next will be the test list. On the test, you will be presented with non-word cues. These 
 are strings of letters that look like words but are not actual words. Sometimes these 
 non-word cues will LOOK LIKE studied words in their visual appearance. For example, 
 CARDLE looks like the word CANDLE. Sometimes they will not look like a studied 
 word. Your first task will be to rate how familiar the nonword cue seems to you. We are 
 primarily interested in feelings of familiarity when recall fails. For example, sometimes a 
 person will just have a feeling of familiarity, like when you see a person’s face and 
 recognize the person as familiar but cannot pinpoint why. So even if you cannot recall a 
 specific studied word that resembles the test cue, you should rate how strong your 
 feeling of familiarity is in response to the cue on a scale of 0-10 (0=no feeling of 
 familiarity; 10=strong feelings of familiarity). If you failed to recall a studied word in 
 response to the cue but you have a strong feeling of familiarity, you would give the cue 
 a high rating on the scale of 0-10. If you don’t have any feeling of familiarity, you would 
 give it a low rating. 
 
Depending of which of the three conditions they were in participants were given slightly 
different instructions. In the recollection condition they saw: 
You will then be asked to indicate your confidence in recalling the background 
color of the word and then to guess the color, after the test block ends, we will 
show you what the background colors were for each cue. 
 
Participants in the logically based prediction condition saw: 
You will then be asked to indicate your confidence in predicting the upcoming 
background color of the word and then to guess the color based on the studied 
background. After the test block ends, we will show you what the background 
colors became for each cue. 
 
In the irrational prediction condition participants saw: 
 You will then be asked to indicate your confidence in predicting the upcoming 
 background color of the cue and then to guess the color. After the test block ends, we 
 will show you what the background colors became for each cue. 
 
Participants in all conditions then saw: 
 Lastly you will be asked if you can recall a studied word that looks like the cue. For 
 example, if the cue was CARDLE and it made you think of the word CANDLE from the 
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 study list you would type in CANDLE. If you cannot think of a studied word from the list 
 that looks like the cue, simply press Enter (remember that some of the time the cue will 
 NOT correspond to any studied word). 
 
Participants then began a test block of 24 non-word cues. Each cue appeared in white on a grey 
background. Participants were asked several questions and typed their responses into a dialogue 
box. The first question was “Do you feel like this cue resembles a studied word? Rate the 
familiarity of this item on a scale of 0-10, 0=no feeling of familiarity, 10=strong feeling of 
familiarity”. Participants then typed in a number from 0 to 10 and pressed enter. If a number was 
not typed and the participants pressed enter the same dialogue box stayed on the screen. This 
familiarity rating was the same for all three conditions.  
The next question was different depending on the condition. In the recollection condition 
participants were asked:  
 Do you feel like you recall the background color of the studied word? Rate your feeling 
 of recalling the background color on a scale of 0-10, 0=no feeling of recalling the color, 
 10=strong feeling of recalling the color.  
 
Participants then typed in a number from 0 to 10 and pressed enter. This was followed by “What 
was the background color? Was the background color blue or green? B=blue, G=Green”. 
Participants pressed B or G and pressed enter.  
In the logically based prediction condition participants were asked:  
 Do you feel like you can predict what the background color of this word will be based on 
 the studied background? Rate your feeling of predicting the background color on a scale 
 of 0-10. 0=no feeling of predicting the color, 10=strong feeling of predicting the color. 
 Participants then entered a number from 0 to 10 and pressed enter.  
 
This was followed by “What will the background color be? Will the background be color blue or 
green? B=blue, G=green” Participants pressed B or G and pressed enter. 
Participants in the irrational prediction were asked:  
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 Do you feel like you can predict what the background color of this word will be? Rate 
 your feeling of predicting the background color on a scale of 0-10. 0=no feeling of 
 predicting the color, 10=strong feeling of predicting the color. 
 
As noted before, the study words in the irrational prediction condition did not appear with a 
green or blue background making the outcome seem random to participants. This would be 
similar to predicting something like a coin flip. Any feelings of prediction would be irrational in 
nature since there was nothing to base the prediction on. Participants then typed in a number 
from 0 to 10 and pressed enter. This was followed by “What will the background color be?” 
Participants pressed B or G and pressed enter. 
 Lastly, participants were asked “Can you recall a word from the study list that looked like 
this? If so, type it in.” Participants typed in a word and pressed enter or left the box blank and 
pressed enter if they had no guess. This part was the same for all three conditions. 
 Participants completed these judgments for the 24 test cues in that block. Of the 24 cues, 
8 overlapped with four studied items each, 8 overlapped with only one studied item each, and 8 
did not overlap with any studied items. This served as my manipulation of familiarity. 
Participants then completed three other study blocks each followed by a test block. Each block 
followed the same procedure except that new stimuli were used.  
 Upon completing a test block participants in all three conditions were shown “here is 
what the correct answer was for each cue”. Only the high overlap and low overlap cues were 
shown since there was no correct answer for the non-overlapping cues. Each of the cues were 
shown on the screen one at a time for one second each. They were each highlighted in the correct 







CHAPTER 3 – RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 Each trial was coded by hand (in case of spelling errors) as either recalled (the participant 
recalled a word resembling the cue) or unrecalled (the participant was unable to recall a 
corresponding word). As in Ryals and Cleary (2012) any of the four words could be recalled 
even if the cue was from the low overlap or no overlap condition.   
Cued Recall 
 I performed a 3 x 3 overlap (high overlap, low overlap, no overlap) x judgment type 
(recollection, logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) mixed factor ANOVA on cued 
recall rates. In replication of prior work (Ryals & Cleary, 2012), there was a significant main 
effect of overlap on cued recall rates, F(2, 222) = 500.18, MSE = .01, p < .001, ηp2 = .82. The 
means are displayed in Figure 1. There was no overlap x judgment type interaction, F < 1, and 
no main effect of task type, F < 1. Given the null interaction, the three judgment types were 
collapsed for the following analyses. High overlap cues led to more cued recall than low overlap 
cues, t(113) = 16.68, SE = .01, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.39. Low overlap cues also led to more 




Figure 1. Cued recall rates by overlap level and judgment type. Bars represent standard errors. 
 
Familiarity During Recall Failure (Recognition Without Cued Recall) 
 Next, I examined the familiarity ratings given to cues whose studied word could not be 
recalled (Figure 2). I performed a 3 x 3 overlap (high overlap, low overlap, no overlap) x 
judgment type (recollection, logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) mixed factor 
ANOVA on familiarity ratings. This served as a manipulation check for the familiarity 
manipulation. There was a significant main effect of overlap, F(2, 222) = 98.14, MSE = .72, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .47. The overlap x judgment type interaction was not significant, F < 1, neither was 
the main effect of judgment type, F < 1. Given the null interaction, the three judgment types 
were collapsed for the following analyses. High overlap cues were rated as more familiar than 
low overlap cues, t(113) = 7.12, SE = .12, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .52. Low overlap cues were 


























Figure 2. Familiarity ratings by overlap and judgment type. Bars represent standard errors. 
Confidence in Knowing the Color 
 Turning to my primary question of color recollection ratings, logically based color 
prediction ratings, and irrational color prediction ratings, which I will refer to broadly as 
confidence in knowing the color ratings, I performed a 3 x 3 overlap (high overlap, low overlap, 
no overlap) x judgment type (recollection, logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) 
mixed factor ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of overlap, F(2, 222) = 45.05, MSE 
= .34, p < .001, ηp2 = .29. The means are shown in Figure 3. The overlap x judgment type 
interaction was not significant, F < 1. There was also no main effect of judgment type, F < 1. 
Given the null interaction, the three judgment types were collapsed for the following analyses. 
High overlap cues received higher confidence in knowing the color ratings than low overlap 
cues, t(113) = 5.38, SE = .09,  p < .001, Cohen’s d = .29. Low overlap cues received higher 
confidence in knowing the color ratings than no overlap cues, t(113) = 4.51, SE = .05, p < .001, 






























Figure 3. Confidence in knowing the color ratings by overlap level and judgment type. Bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
Color Recollection and Logically Based Prediction Accuracy 
 During recall failure, in the recollection condition, color accuracy for high overlap cues 
was not above chance but approached being significantly above chance (M = .537, SD = .13), 
t(39) = 1.80, p = .08. Color accuracy did not rise above chance among low overlap cues, 
however (M = .49, SD = .11), t < 1. In the logically based prediction condition high overlap cues 
were above chance (M = .55, SD = .16), t(38) = 2.06, p = .05, whereas low overlap cues did not 
show above chance accuracy (M = .48, SD = .12), t(38) = -1.13. p = .27. In the irrational 
prediction condition, there was no basis on which performance could have been above chance (as 
there was no corresponding studied color information in that condition).  
Judgments During Recall Success 
 During recall success, participants in the color recollection condition did show above 
chance color recollection accuracy for high overlap cues (M = .56, SD = .14), t(39) = 2.61, p 
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participants in the logically based prediction condition for high overlap cues (M = .58, SD = .13), 
t(38) = 3.72, p < .001. Low overlap cues also showed above chance accuracy (M = .57, SD 
= .13), t(38) = 3.12, p = .003.  The irrational prediction condition did not have a basis on which 
to be accurate, as there was no corresponding studied information in this condition.  
 For successful cued recall displayed in Figure 4, there was a difference between high 
overlap and low overlap cues on familiarity ratings, t(113) = 8.06, p < .001, SE = .15, Cohen’s d 
= .41. I also performed a 2 x 2 x 3 recall status (recalled or unrecalled) x overlap (high overlap or 
low overlap) x judgment type (recollection, logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) 
mixed factor ANOVA on familiarity ratings. There was a significant main effect of recall, F(1, 
111) = 598.99, MSE = 2.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .84, such that higher familiarity ratings were given 
during successful recall. There was not a significant recall x overlap interaction on familiarity 
ratings as in Ryals & Cleary (2012), F(2, 111) = 1.39, MSE = .68, p = .23, ηp2 = .01. There was 
also no recall x judgment type interaction on familiarity ratings, F(2, 111) = 2.46, MSE = 2.95, p 
= .09, ηp2 = .04, or overlap x judgment type x recall interaction, overlap x judgment type, or 






Figure 4. Familiarity ratings by overlap and judgment type for successful cued recall. Bars 
represent standard errors.  
 
 Collapsing across judgment type for confidence in knowing the color ratings, there was a 
difference between high overlap cues (M = 4.86, SD = 2.24) and low overlap cues (M = 4.45, SD 
= 2.25), t(113) = 4.48, SE = .16, p < .001 Cohen’s d = .18. The results are shown in Figure 5. I 
also performed a 2 x 2 x 3 recall status (recalled or unrecalled) x overlap (high overlap or low 
overlap) x judgment type (recollection, logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) mixed 
factor ANOVA on confidence in knowing the color ratings. There was no overlap x recall 
interaction, F < 1. There was no main effect of judgment type, F < 1. The three-way recall status 
x overlap x judgment type interaction was not significant, F(2, 111) = 2.08, MSE = .62, p = .13, 
ηp2 = .04. The overlap x judgment type interaction was not significant, F(2, 111) = 2.79, MSE 
= .31, p = .07, ηp2 = .05. There was a significant main effect of recall, F(1, 111 = 226.76, MSE = 
2.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .67 on confidence in knowing the color ratings. However, the judgment type 
x recall interaction was significant, F(2, 111) = 11.62, MSE = 2.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .17. 
Combining high and low overlap, recall had a larger effect in the recollection, t(39) = 10.53, SE 
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Cohen’s d = 1.47, than in the irrational prediction condition, t(34) = 4.22, SE = .25, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = .55 on confidence in knowing the color ratings.  
 
Figure 5. Confidence in knowing the color ratings for successful cued recall by overlap and 
judgment type. Bars represent standard errors. 
 
Block Analyses 
 Huebert et al. (2020) did not provide feedback for recollection accuracy. It could be the 
case that when participants saw the correct answers after every block that this would diminish 
their sense of recollection or prediction (since they would likely be at chance). This could result 
in participants’ recollection and prediction ratings declining with each block. To examine this 
possibility, I broke down the familiarity ratings and recollection or prediction ratings into the 
four test blocks. It could be the case that participants familiarity has unique effects for each 
judgment type or overall in the first block, but this diminishes over time. Cued recall and color 
recollection or prediction accuracy were not analyzed by block as they were not relevant to my 
research question. They would have simply been a fishing expedition. 
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 The means for familiarity ratings by judgment type and block are displayed in Figures 6-
9. I performed a 3 x 3 x 4 overlap (high overlap, low overlap, or no overlap) x judgment type 
(recollection, logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) x block (first, second, third, or 
fourth block) mixed factor ANOVA on familiarity ratings. The overlap x judgment type x block 
interaction was not significant, F(12, 612) = 1.72, MSE = 2.19, p = .06, ηp2 = .03. There was no 
significant overlap x judgment type interaction, F < 1. The block x judgment type interaction 
was not significant, F < 1. There was no main effect of Block, F < 1, or judgment type, F < 1. 
The block x overlap interaction on familiarity ratings was significant, F(6, 612) = 3.80, MSE = 
2.19, p = .001, ηp2 = .04. 
 The effect of overlap on familiarity ratings differed by block. For the first block (Figure 
6), collapsed across judgment type, there was a significant effect of cue overlap, F(2, 224) = 
23.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, High overlap cues felt more familiar than low overlap cues, t(112) = 
3.01, SE = .24, p = .003, Cohen’s d = .32. Low overlap cues felt more familiar than no overlap 
cues, t(113) = 4.56, SE = .14, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .36.   
 For the second block (Figure 7), there was also a significant effect of overlap, F(2, 220) = 
25.91, MSE = 2.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .19, High overlap cues were rated as more familiar than low 
overlap cues, t(110) = 4.34, SE = .27, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .47. Low overlap cues felt more 
familiar than no overlap cues, t(113) = 2.22, SE = .17, p = .03, Cohen’s d = .18.   
 For the third block (Figure 8), there was a significant effect of overlap, F(2, 212) = 47.76, 
MSE = 2.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. High overlap cues felt more familiar than low overlap cues, 
t(106) = 4.85, SE = .25, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .45. Low overlap cues felt more familiar than no 
overlap cues, t(113) = 6.00, SE = .17, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .51. 
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 For the fourth block (Figure 9), there was a significant effect of overlap, F(2, 224) = 
21.77, MSE 2.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. High overlap cues were not rated as more familiar than low 
overlap cues, t(112) = 1.73, SE = .21, p = .09, Cohen’s d = .16. Low overlap cues were rated as 
more familiar than no overlap cues, t(113) = 4.61, SE = .20, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .45. Thus, the 
predicted higher familiarity for high overlap cues over low overlap cues was not found in the 
fourth block but was consistent in all prior blocks. It is certainly plausible that the effect of cue 
overlap could diminish steadily across blocks due to the accumulation of features in memory. 
However, there was not a consistent decline in the effect of overlap with blocks, and the 
difference between low overlap and no overlap cues was the same across blocks.   
   
Figure 6. Familiarity ratings for failed recall by overlap and judgment type for block one. Bars 






























Figure 7. Familiarity ratings for failed recall by overlap and judgment type for block two. Bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 
Figure 8. Familiarity ratings for failed recall by overlap and judgment type for block three. Bars 
























































Figure 9. Familiarity ratings for failed recall by overlap and judgment type for block four. Bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
Confidence in Knowing the Color 
 The means are shown in Figures 10-13. I performed a 3 x 3 x 4 overlap (high overlap, 
low overlap, or no overlap) x judgment type (recollection, logically based prediction, or 
irrational prediction) x block (first, second, third, or fourth block) mixed factor ANOVA on 
confidence in knowing the color ratings. The three-way interaction was not significant, F(12, 
612) = 1.45, MSE = .96, p = .14, ηp2 = .03. The block x judgment type interaction was not 
significant, F < 1. The main effect of block was not significant, F(3, 306) = 1.02, MSE = 2.72, p 
= .39, ηp2 = .01. The main effect of overlap was significant, F(2,204) = 47.64, MSE = 1.33, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .32. The overlap x judgment type interaction was not significant, F < 1. The main 
effect of judgment type was not significant, F < 1. The block x overlap interaction was 
significant, F(6, 612) = 3.30, MSE = .96, p = .003, ηp2 = .03.  
 The effect of overlap on confidence in knowing the color ratings differed by block. For 
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1.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. High overlap cues were given higher confidence in knowing the color 
ratings than low overlap cues, t(112) = 2.37, SE = .16, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .19. Low overlap 
cues were given higher confidence in knowing the color ratings than no overlap cues, t(113) = 
2.30, SE = .10, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .12.  
 For the second block (Figure 11), there was also a significant effect of overlap, F(2, 224) 
= 20.88, MSE = 1.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .23. High overlap cues were given higher confidence 
knowing the color ratings than low overlap cues, t(110) = 4.68, SE = .16, p < .001, Cohen’s d 
= .36. Low overlap cues were not given higher confidence in knowing the color ratings than no 
overlap cues, t < 1.  
 For the third block (Figure 12), there was also a significant effect of overlap, F(2, 212) = 
32.08, MSE = 1.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .23. High overlap cues were given higher confidence in 
knowing the color ratings than low overlap cues, t(106) = 4.93, SE = .16, p < .001, Cohen’s d 
= .34. Low overlap cues were given higher confidence in knowing the color ratings than no 
overlap cues, t(113) = 3.50, SE = .11, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .21. 
 For the fourth block (Figure 13), there was also a significant effect of overlap, F(2, 224) 
= 6.65, MSE = .94, p = .002, ηp2 = .06. High overlap cues were given higher confidence in 
knowing the color ratings than low overlap cues, t(110) = 1.43, SE = .14, p = .16, Cohen’s d 
= .10, Low overlap cues were given higher confidence in knowing the color ratings than no 
overlap cues, t(113) = 2.36, SE = .11, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .13. 
 Thus, the effect of overlap was different by block. The predicted differences in 
confidence in knowing the color ratings were found in all blocks except blocks two and four. In 
block two low overlap cues were not given higher confidence in knowing the color ratings than 
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no overlap cues. In block four, high overlap cues were not given higher confidence in knowing 
the color ratings than low overlap cues.  
 
Figure 10. Confidence in knowing the color ratings by overlap and judgment type in block one. 
Bars represent standard errors. 
 
Figure 11. Confidence in knowing the color ratings by overlap and judgment type in block two. 
















































































Figure 12. Confidence in knowing the color ratings by overlap and judgment type in block three. 
Bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
Figure 13. Confidence in knowing the color ratings by overlap and judgment type in block four. 
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CHAPTER 4 – EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
 Experiment 2 was a conceptual replication of Experiment 1. Thus, it was largely the same 
except that it used the sound-based judgment of Huebert et al. (2020) Experiment 3. That is, 
study words were presented in black on a white background and a high- or low-pitched tone was 
played in the background in the recollection and logically based prediction conditions. No 
background tone was played in the irrational prediction condition. In the recollection condition 
participants had to indicate their confidence in recollecting the background sound. In the 
logically based prediction condition participants had to indicate their confidence in predicting the 
upcoming background sound based on the studied sound. In the irrational prediction condition 
participants had to indicate their confidence in predicting the upcoming background sound (with 
nothing to base it on). 
Method 
Participants  
 Eighty-nine participants completed Experiment 2. I determined 90 participants to be a 
large enough sample size based on the same power analysis discussed in Experiment 1 and the 
Appendix. However, unexpected no shows resulted in 89 participants. 
Design 
 Experiment 2 used the same three (cue overlap; high overlap, low overlap, or no overlap) 
by three (judgment type; recollection, logically based prediction, irrational prediction) mixed 
design as Experiment 1. 
Materials  
The materials for Experiment 2 were the same materials from Ryals and Cleary (2012) and 




 The procedure was the same as Experiment 1 except that the source memory/prediction 
judgment was based on a background sound. Participants studied words in the same manner but 
instead of a green or blue background each study word appeared in black on a white background 
and was accompanied by either a high or low-pitched sound. The sound lasted one second. This 
was also included to assess recollection. Both the instructions before each test block and the 
dialogue boxes during the test blocks were the same except that they asked about sounds instead 
of colors. At the end of the test block participants saw each cue from that block and the correct 





















 Trials in Experiment 2 were coded as recalled or unrecalled in the same manner as 
Experiment 1. The cued recall means are shown in Figure 14. First, I examined cued recall rates 
with a 3 x 3 overlap (high overlap, low overlap, no overlap) x judgment type (recollection, 
logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) mixed factor ANOVA on cued recall rates. 
As in Ryals and Cleary (2012), there was a significant main effect of cue overlap, F(2, 172) = 
299.19, MSE =  0.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .78, Low overlap cues produced higher recall than no 
overlap cues, t(88) = 14.12, SE = 0.01, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.55, demonstrating significant 
cued recall. High overlap cues produced higher recall than low overlap cues, t(88) = 14.74, SE 
= .02, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.33. The recall x judgment type interaction was not significant, 
F(4, 172) = 1.01, MSE = .01, p = .41, ηp2 = .02. The main effect of judgment type was also not 






Figure 14. Cued recall rates for overlap levels and judgment types. Bars represent standard 
errors. 
 
Familiarity During Recall Failure (Recognition Without Cued Recall) 
 The means for perceived cue familiarity (recognition without cued recall) are shown in 
Figure 15. I performed a 3 x 3 overlap (high overlap, low overlap, no overlap) x judgment type 
(recollection, logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) mixed factor ANOVA on 
familiarity ratings. There was a significant effect of cue overlap, F(2, 172) = 66.76, MSE = 0.58, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .44. The main effect of judgment type was not significant, F < 1. There was no 
overlap x judgment type interaction, F < 1. Since the interaction was not significant, overlap 
levels were combined for the following t tests. High overlap cues were rated as more familiar 
than low overlap cues, t(88) = 6.79, SE = 0.13, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.47. Low overlap cues 



























Figure 15. Familiarity ratings for overlap levels and judgment types. Bars represent standard 
errors. 
 
Confidence in Knowing the Sound 
 Turning to my primary question, I examined the effect of cue overlap on the three 
judgment types (Figure 16), which I will refer to as confidence in knowing the sound ratings. I 
performed a 3 x 3 overlap (high overlap, low overlap, no overlap) x judgment type (recollection, 
logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) mixed factor ANOVA on confidence in 
knowing the sound ratings. There was a main effect of cue overlap on confidence in knowing the 
sound ratings, F(2, 172) = 24.71, MSE = 0.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. The main effect of cue overlap 
was not qualified by an interaction, F(4, 172) = 1.71, p = .15, ηp2 = .04. There was also no main 
effect of judgment type, F(2, 86) = .75, MSE = 9.17, p = .48, η2 = .02. Judgment types were 
combined across conditions for the following t-tests. High overlap cues were given higher 
confidence in knowing the sound ratings than low overlap cues, t(88) = 4.17, SE = .10, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = .22. Low overlap cues were given higher confidence in knowing the sound ratings 






























Figure 16. Confidence in knowing the sound ratings for overlap levels and judgment types. Bars 
represent standard errors.  
 
Sound Recollection and Logically Based Prediction Accuracy 
 Next, I examined the possibility that participants did show above chance (.50) ability to 
recollect or predict the sound during recall failure. In the recollection condition and for high 
overlap cues, participants were not above chance in recollecting the background sound (M = .53, 
SD = .13), t(26) = 1.11, , p = .28. For low overlap cues, participants were also not above chance 
(M = .49, SD = .11), t < 1. 
 For the logically based prediction condition and high overlap cues, participants were not 
above chance (M = .50, SD = .11), t < 1. For low overlap cues, participants were also not above 
chance (M = .51, SD = .51),  t < 1, Actual predictive ability in the irrational-prediction condition 
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Judgments During Recall Success 
 During recall success, high overlap cues did not show above chance recollection accuracy 
(M = .51, SD = .20), t < 1. Participants were also not above chance for low overlap cues (M 
= .53, SD = .21), t < 1. 
 In the logically based prediction condition participants were not above chance in the high 
overlap condition (M = .53, SD = .17), t < 1. They were also not significantly above chance for 
low overlap cues (M = .56, SD = .18), t(31) = 1.18, p = .09.  
 For trials where recall succeeded (Figure 17), collapsing across judgment type, high 
overlap cues were given higher familiarity ratings than low overlap cues, t(87) = 3.43, SE = .14, 
p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.34. I performed a 2 x 2 x 3 recall status (recalled or unrecalled) by 
overlap (high overlap or low overlap) x judgment type (recollection, logically based prediction, 
or irrational prediction) mixed factor ANOVA on cued familiarity ratings. However, as in Ryals 
and Cleary (2012), there was a significant recall x overlap interaction, F(1, 85) = 4.89, MSE 
= .62, p = .03, ηp2 = .05, where cue overlap had a smaller effect during recall success. There was 
a main effect of recall, F(1, 85) = 476.87, MSE = 2.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .86, where successful cued 
recall led to higher familiarity ratings. The three-way interaction between recall x overlap x 
judgment type was not significant, F < 1. The recall x judgment type interaction was also not 




Figure 17. Familiarity ratings during successful cued recall by overlap and judgment type. Bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
 For trials where recall succeeded, and collapsed across judgment type, high overlap cues 
(M = 5.41, SD = 2.48) were given higher confidence in knowing the sound ratings than low 
overlap cues (M = 4.83, SD = 2.41), t(87) = 3.46, SE = .17, Cohen’s d = .24, (Figure 18). I 
performed a 2 x 2 x 3 recall status (recalled or unrecalled) by overlap (high overlap or low 
overlap) x judgment type (recollection, logically-based prediction, or irrational prediction) mixed 
factor ANOVA on confidence in knowing the sound ratings, However, as in Huebert et al. 
(2020), there was no significant recall x overlap interaction, F < 1. The main effect of recall was 
significant, F(1, 85) = 201.83, MSE = 2.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .70, where cued recall meant higher 
confidence in knowing the sound ratings. The three-way interaction between recall x overlap x 
judgment type was not significant, F < 1 The recall x judgment type interaction was also not 






























Figure 18. Confidence in knowing the sound ratings by judgment type and overlap for successful 
cued recall. Bars represent standard errors. 
 
Block Analyses 
Familiarity During Recall Failure (Recognition Without Cued Recall)  
 I performed a 3 x 3 x 4  overlap (high overlap, low overlap, or no overlap) x judgment 
type (recollection, logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) x block (first, second, 
third, or fourth block) mixed factor ANOVA on familiarity ratings (Figures 19-22). There was a 
significant main effect of block, F(3, 210) = 3.43, MSE = 2.72, p = .01, ηp2 = .05. There was a 
main effect of overlap, F(2, 140) = 52.23. MSE = 1.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .43. The block x judgment 
type interaction was not significant, F < 1. The overlap x judgment type interaction was also not 
significant, F < 1. The block x overlap interaction was not significant, F(6, 420) = 1.54, MSE = 
1.99, p = .16, ηp2 = .02,. The block x overlap x judgment type interaction was also not significant, 
F(12, 420) = 1.11, MSE = 1.99, p = .35, ηp2 = .03. The main effect of judgment type was also not 
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 With regard to blocks, there was a significant difference between the second and third 
block, t(255) = 2.23, SE = .13, p = .03 ,Cohen’s d = .13, with the second block receiving lower 
ratings overall than the third block. The first and second, and third and fourth blocks were not 
different (ts < 1).   
 


































Figure 20. Familiarity ratings by overlap and judgment type for block two. Bars represent 
standard errors. 
 


























































Figure 22. Familiarity ratings by overlap and judgment type for block four. Bars represent 
standard errors. 
 
Confidence in Knowing the Sound 
I performed a 3 x 3 x 4 overlap (high overlap, low overlap, or no overlap) x judgment 
type (recollection, logically based prediction, or irrational prediction) x block (first, second, 
third, or fourth block) mixed factor ANOVA on confidence in knowing the color ratings (Figures 
23-26). There was no significant effect of block, F(3, 210) = 2.19, MSE = 3.87, p = .09, ηp2 = .03, 
or judgment type, F < 1, or overlap x block interaction, F < 1. The block x judgment type 
interaction was not significant, F < 1. There was a significant effect of overlap, F(2, 140) = 
25.71, MSE = 1.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. The overlap x judgment type interaction was not 
significant F(4, 140) = 2.04, MSE = 1.11, p = .09, ηp2  = .06. The block x overlap x judgment 






























Figure 23. Confidence in knowing the sound ratings by overlap and judgment type for block one. 
Bars represent standard errors.  
 
Figure 24. Confidence in knowing the sound ratings by overlap and judgment type for block 




















































































Figure 25. Confidence in knowing the sound ratings by overlap and judgment type for block 
three. Bars represent standard errors.  
 
Figure 26. Confidence in knowing the sound ratings by overlap and judgment type for block 




















































































High Overlap Low Overlap No Overlap
58 
 
CHAPTER 6 – GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
Overview of the Present Study 
 The first purpose of this thesis was to experimentally examine the role of familiarity in 
illusions of prediction. It has been argued that a major function of human memory is to think 
about and predict the future (Schacter et al., 2007). One might expect recall of specific details to 
be needed for prediction, yet the research on déjà vu (Cleary et al., 2018) suggests that illusions 
of prediction can be driven by mere feelings of familiarity. Based on this work, the present study 
investigated whether familiarization of a stimulus contributes to illusions of prediction. The 
second purpose of this thesis was to examine how familiarity might uniquely affect past-oriented, 
future-oriented, and irrational future-oriented decisions. 
 In Experiment 1, there was evidence that familiarity plays a role in illusions of prediction 
outside the realm of déjà vu (e.g., Cleary & Claxton, 2018). Experiment 1 replicated the finding 
that manipulating feature overlap (as in Ryals and Cleary, 2012) led to a systematic increase in 
familiarity during recall failure. This was an important manipulation check (in showing that the 
cue familiarization manipulation for systematically increasing the perceived familiarity of cues 
during instances of recall failure was effective at doing so). The systematically increased 
familiarity of the test cues during instances of recall failure in turn led to participants either 1) 
feeling that they could recall the background color, 2) predict the upcoming background color 
based on prior background color, or 3) even predict a random upcoming background color. The 
effects of familiarity on these confidence in knowing the color judgments were the same for all 
three conditions. The logically based prediction condition did show above chance prediction, but 
the recollection condition did not. 
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Experiment 2 was designed to be a conceptual replication of Experiment 1. The only 
thing that changed was the recollection or prediction judgment used. Instead of displaying each 
study word on a green or blue background, a high or low pitched background sound was played 
with each study word. The results of Experiment 2 were largely the same as Experiment 1. 
Manipulating feature overlap again led to a systematic increase in familiarity during recall failure 
(as in Ryals and Cleary, 2012). This familiarity led to an increase in recollection, logically based 
prediction, and irrational prediction confidence each in a similar manner. In contrast to 
Experiment 1, neither the recollection nor logically based prediction conditions were above 
chance in accuracy. Thus, Experiment 2 provided further support that familiarity plays a role in 
illusions of prediction. Experiment 2 also extended the generality of this finding to sound related 
prediction. 
The Role of Familiarity in Illusions of Prediction 
For the primary question of familiarity and feelings of prediction, the results supported 
my hypothesis. Manipulating feature overlap between study and test items and thus the 
familiarity led to a systematic increase in feelings of prediction. This suggests that feelings of 
familiarity can create feelings of prediction.  
 Returning to the example of a truck given earlier, a sense of familiarity, without recall 
such as where the truck turned last time, could create feelings of prediction. However, these 
feelings of familiarity seem to only create illusions of prediction. One would expect that 
recollection of where the truck turned last time, or in my experiments, recollection of what the 
background color or sound was, would create feelings of prediction. This is because those details 
would likely need to be recalled to make any accurate prediction. This was seen in part from the 
color accuracy during recall success in Experiment 1. Participants did show some ability to 
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predict the color when recall succeeded. Surprisingly, Experiment 2 did not show this pattern. 
Participants were not above chance in predicting or recollecting the background sound when 
recall succeeded.  
 If participants do show some sort of recollection or predictive ability, then one would 
expect their confidence to reflect that ability. Yet, when recall fails, people still show an increase 
in prediction confidence as a function of familiarity despite being barely above chance 
(Experiment 1) or not above chance (Experiment 2). This suggests that much like déjà vu (Cleary 
et al. 2018), familiarity creates illusions of prediction.     
 My results also provide evidence of a theory by Cleary et al. (2018), who suggested that 
familiarity may drive feelings of prediction during déjà vu. This was built on the finding that 
among déjà vu reports, those with feelings of prediction received higher feelings of familiarity 
ratings than déjà vu reports that were not accompanied by feelings of prediction. Here I have 
found experimental evidence of this theory: that familiarity creates feelings of prediction. 
However, future research could examine this theory in more traditional déjà vu paradigms 
involving dynamic videos. Cleary et al. (2018) found that feelings of prediction during déjà vu 
were associated with high familiarity. My results also show that familiarity and feelings of 
prediction are not unique to déjà vu, since we would not expect déjà vu to be experienced with 
word recognition. Although future research could examine if déjà vu is associated with feelings 
of prediction above just the familiarity that accompanies déjà vu.  
 It is important to note that the logically based prediction condition did show above 
chance prediction during recall failure in the high overlap condition in Experiment 1. However, 
Experiment 2 failed to replicate this finding. What might be the case is that during recall failure, 
in the high overlap condition participants do have above chance recollection or prediction ability. 
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This would fit with what Cleary and Claxton (2018) found, which was that a meta-analysis 
indicated above chance predictive ability when considering all experiments. However, this effect 
was extremely small and weak compared to the feelings of prediction. So, while participants 
might show a very small amount of memory-based predictive ability during recall failure, their 
feelings of prediction are more often an illusory product of déjà vu and the feelings of familiarity 
from déjà vu. The same could be said here, participants in the high overlap condition might have 
above chance recollection or prediction that was inconsistently obtained across experiments. 
However, their increase in confidence is almost entirely a familiarity driven illusion. 
 There are a number of reasons why familiarity could create feelings of prediction. One 
possibility is that familiarity creates feelings of positivity (Monin, 2003). Being able to 
successfully predict something is a positive outcome. Participants might associate a sense of 
familiarity with this positive outcome of being able to predict either the sound or color. Another 
possibility is that familiarity operates in a manner similar to tip of the tongue states. Cleary and 
Claxton (2018) argued that the continued familiarity of a dynamically unfolding scene would 
create a feeling of knowing how the scene will unfold is on the verge of retrieval. This is similar 
to how a word may feel on the verge of retrieval during a tip of the tongue state. 
 Another possibility is that familiarity has a learned association with predictive ability. For 
example, consider an employee entering the building the employee has worked at for a number 
of years. The employee would have plenty of ability to predict who might be encountered on the 
way up the stairs, or who will be in their offices as the employee passes by. Having worked at 
the building for several years, the employee would of course have a strong sense of familiarity 
with the building. Thus, perhaps the employee would have learned an association between 
familiarity and predictive ability. However, in this example, recollection of specific details 
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would likely be required to predict such encounters. With the paradigm used, it would be as if 
the employee still interprets their familiarity as predictive ability, but with the recollection of 
specifics removed the employee would have largely or entirely illusions of prediction.  
 Yet another possibility is one put forth by Cleary et al. (2019). This was that people often 
report feelings of hindsight bias during déjà vu states. Specifically, participants are more likely to 
think they predicted the outcome of a turn in a déjà vu state. Cleary et al. also found that this 
hindsight bias was associated with high familiarity ratings. They argued that participants 
misinterpret feelings of familiarity as having successfully predicted something. Although 
feelings of postdiction were not investigated here, their possible relation to the current findings is 
also something for future research. If feelings of postdiction are driven by familiarity, then this 
could also explain why people associate familiarity with feelings of prediction. That is, a person 
might often feel a sense of familiarity and interpret that has having predicted something 
successfully. This would in turn lead them to associate familiarity with the ability to predict 
something before it happens. Future research could attempt to tease apart these various 
explanations for why familiarity tends to create feelings of prediction. 
Comparing Recollection, Logically Based Prediction, and Irrational Prediction 
 Another question of this thesis was if past and future oriented decisions would be 
differently affected by familiarity. As was discussed earlier, past and future thinking are closely 
linked (e.g., Addis et al., 2007). However, familiarity can also be used differently for past 
recognition and judgments of future recognition (Cleary, 2015). I found that familiarity had 
similar effects on recollection and prediction. The judgment essentially was the same between 
the recollection and logically based prediction conditions, simply phrasing the judgment as being 
a matter of recollection or prediction did not alter the use of familiarity. This is more consistent 
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with the notion that past and future thinking are largely the same. Still, future research could 
investigate other situations where familiarity is used uniquely for past and future thinking.   
 Another question of this thesis was to what extent the prediction judgments needed to be 
rational in nature. One might expect that the prediction needs to be something that could at least 
plausibly be predicted in order to have feelings of prediction. Again, returning to the truck 
example, a person might need to at least feel that where the truck turned last time could possibly 
be remembered or predicted based on some prior memory. In these experiments, participants in 
the logically based prediction conditions were given something which they could plausibly 
predict; an upcoming color or sound based on a studied color or sound. In the irrational 
prediction condition, they attempted to predict something with no basis to make that prediction. 
However, I found that participants still showed increases in feelings of prediction as a function of 
familiarity when the outcome was random. Previous research has not investigated familiarity and 
irrational prediction directly, however this result is not unheard of. With regard to déjà vu, 
participants of course show feelings of prediction (Cleary & Claxton, 2018). This is despite the 
fact that déjà vu is defined as a feeling of familiarity despite knowing the situation is new. So 
logically participants should not report any feeling of prediction during déjà vu. Bear and Bloom 
(2016) have also shown that participants feel that they predicted a random outcome more often 
than they could have. Furthermore, the effect of familiarity on irrational feelings of prediction 
were not significantly less than the effect of familiarity on recollection or logically based feelings 
of prediction.  
 The finding that familiarity creates irrational feelings of prediction also has implications 
for the reason why familiarity creates logically based feelings of prediction. Participants should 
base their prediction on the background color or sound of the study word, which would be 
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recollection based. One might argue that familiarity creates these feelings of recollection (as in 
Huebert et al., 2020), which in turn creates feelings of prediction, since the prediction is based on 
past recollection. However, this might not be the case given the findings of the irrational 
prediction conditions. Since study words were on a gray background or had no sound, there were 
no feelings of past recollection to be created by familiarity. Thus, rather than the mediation 
discussed, familiarity might more directly influence feelings of prediction, however, future 
research could also test these two explanations through mediation models. Such models would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis but could be a useful future direction.  
Block Effects 
 I also examined for various effects of blocks. Though block effects in recognition without 
identification are not typically seen (Cleary & Specker, 2007), participants were shown that they 
were (presumably) only around chance after every block. It could have been the case that 
providing the answers after every block could have diminished recollection or prediction 
confidence. Therefore, the early blocks could have shown higher confidence than the later 
blocks. Familiarity broken into blocks was also analyzed since it was the key manipulation. 
 There was some evidence of block related effects on familiarity. One might expect 
feature overlap to have smaller effects in later blocks due to the accumulation of features in 
memory. In Experiment 1, the manipulation of feature overlap had somewhat different effects by 
block. For the last block, high overlap cues did not differ from low overlap cues in their 
familiarity. Otherwise, there was not a consistent decline in the magnitude of the effect of feature 
overlap. Furthermore, this block related effect was not replicated in Experiment 2. Given the lack 
of reason behind it, the failure to replicate, and marginally significant interaction, this block 
related effect was likely a type one error.  
65 
 
 Somewhat of a similar pattern was found with confidence in knowing the color ratings in 
Experiment 1. High and low overlap cues did not differ in the last block, but again there was no 
consistent effects of blocks. This and any other block related effects were not replicated in 
Experiment 2. 
 It is important to note that breaking down each analysis by block introduces a lot of 
noise. Participants would have only a small number of trials, particularly in the high overlap 
condition where failed recall is less common. Basing an analysis on fewer trials made it more 
difficult to see a clear pattern. There could be real block related effects on both familiarity and 
confidence in knowing the color or sound, but they are difficult to observe due to a small number 
of observations.   
Summary and Conclusions 
 Familiarity is a curious sensation that everyone has experienced. It is not only a method 
of recognition (Yonelinas, 2002), but that it can be manipulated through feature overlap (Ryals & 
Cleary, 2012) to create (largely) illusory feelings. These feelings can be recollective, logically 
based predictions, or even irrational predictions to the same magnitude. Future research should 
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Appendix A: Figures 
 
Figure 27. Scenes that overlap in structure, from Cleary et al. (2009) 
Appendix B: Power Analysis 
 Since this was not a replication there were no specific effect sizes to use, However, some 
inferences were made from related studies. In Huebert et al. (2020), the effect sizes were fairly 
small. In Experiment 2 The effect of cue overlap on source memory confidence had a Ƞ2p of .237 
(Experiment 3 had a slightly larger effect). While the interaction between recall status and cue 
overlap was also small in Experiment 3 (Ƞ2p = .316, smaller than Experiment 2). Cleary (2015) 
found a judgment type (feeling of knowing vs recognition) x feature overlap interaction was also 
small (Ƞ2p = .282). Lastly, the effect of feature overlap on Feeling of knowing judgments was 
also small (Ƞ2p = .238). 
 To be conservative, I assumed that the effect size would be less than the smallest of effect 
sizes for related studies. Thus, I used the Ƞ2p of less than .238 to test for the effect of feature 
overlap on the prediction condition. For the within between interaction I used a Ƞ2p of less 
than .282.  
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 For the power analysis I used G power (Faul et al., 2007). G power allows for the 
calculation of the required sample size for a desired statistical power and estimated effect size. I 
used an alpha level of .01, and a power of .99. Using a Ƞ2p of .12 (around half of .238 to be safe), 
G power recommends a total sample size of 84 to detect a within participants effect. For the 
within between interaction, I used a Ƞ2p of .14, around half of the effect size by Cleary (2015), G 
power recommends a sample of 63. For the sake of an even number I used 90 participants total, 
meaning 30 per condition. It might seem overly cautious to use such a stringent alpha level and 
require such high power. However, given that these experiments are minimal risk, and relatively 
short it is reasonable to be cautious. 
Appendix C: Stimuli 
Study Word 1 Study Word 2 Study Word 3 Study Word 4 Test Cue   
            
ADRIFT ADEPT ADOPT ADAPT ADEIFT   
ANGLE AMBLE AMPLE ANKLE ARBLE   
AUTOMATIC AUTOMATON AROMATIC AUTOPILOT AUROMORIC 
BALLROOM BALLOON BUFFOON BEDROOM BARELOOM 
BEHOOVES BEEHIVES BELIEVES BEETHOVEN BELHOVES 
BARROW BARREL BORROW BURROW BERRLOW 
HATCH CATCH BATCH BOTCH BETCH   
BAKED BARED BASED BASKED BOSKED   
CABINET CABERET CABERNET CAVELET CABELET   
CRACKLE CACKLE CHUCKLE CRINKLE CARKLE   
CHAPSTICK CHOPSTICK CHADWICK COWLICK CHAWCHICK 
COMMENCE COMMERCE COMMENTS COMMUTES COMMORNCE 
COMPETE COMPOSE COMPOST COMPOTE COMPORE 
CONCATENATE CONCENTRATE CALCULATE CALIBRATE CONCULTATE 
CONSTRUCTION CONSTRICTION CONTRITION CONTRACTION CONSTRATION 
CHORUS CORPUS CORPSE COARSE CORTHUS   
CREATED CREASED CREAMED CHEATED CREAVED   
CLASHES CRASHES CRUSHES CLASSES CRISHES   
DELICATE DELEGATE DEVESTATE DEDICATE DEVICATE 
DISTRICT DESTRUCT DIALECT DISSECT DIATRICT   
DROID DRUID DRIED DREAD DROUD   
ELEGANT ELEPHANT ENCHANT EGGPLANT ERLIGANT 
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EXCURSION EXPULSION EXPANSION EXCISION EXHURSION 
EXPERT EXERT EXCERPT EXCEPT EXOPT   
FELLOW FOLLOW YELLOW FERLOW FENLOW   
COOKS LOOKS BOOKS HOOKS FOOKS   
FLANNEL FUNNEL FENNEL TUNNEL FRONNEL   
GURGLE GIGGLE GOGGLE GOOGLE GORGLE   
GARBLE GERBLE GAMBLE GUMBALL GORMBLE 
GRAPES GRIPES GROPES GRAVES GRODES   
GRAPHITE GRAPHEME GRAPHIC GRAPH GROPHOME 
HEADING HEATING HERDING HEAPING HELDING   
HIPSTER HAMSTER HOLSTER HOISTER HELPSTER   
IMPLEMENT IMPORTANT IMPOTENT IMPATIENT IMPRUTENT 
INCULCATE INTUBATE INCUBATE INORNATE INCORCATE 
LAUNCH LUNCH LURCH LINCH LAURCH   
LIBERATION LITIGATION LIGATION LACERATION LIGEROTION 
LANDLOCK LIVESTOCK LOVESTRUCK LIPSTICK LINDEVOCK 
LONGER LONGED LINGER LOGGER LORGER   
LEAVES LOAVES WEAVES HEAVES LOURVES   
LAQUER LIQUID LIQUOR LOQUAT LUQUET   
MARSUPIAL MANIACAL MUNICIPAL MAGICAL MARNORPICAL 
MITIGATE MIGRATE MEDICATE MEDITATE MATIGOTE 
CAVED SAVED RAVED PAVED MAVED   
MONKEY MURCKY MICKEY MONEY MORCKY   
BEAST YEAST FEAST LEAST NEAST   
NETTLE KETTLE NESTLE NEEDLE NERTLE   
NECESSITY NATIVITY NOTARIETY NOVELTY NORCOSSITY 
ORNITHOLOGY OPTHAMOLOGY OPTOMETRY ORTHOGRAPHY ORNHATROLOGY 
POCKET TICKET PACKET PICKET PERKET   
PHILOSOPHY PHOTOGRAPHY PHILANTHROPY PHONOLOGY PHICTALOPHY 
FINDER BINDER HINDER GRINDER PINDER   
PINNACLE PINEAPPLE PINENEEDLE PARABLE PINNABBLE 
PALLET PELLET PLATELET PIGLET PITLET   
PLANTS PLANKS PLUNKS PLANES PLARKS   
PLEASANT PHEASANT PRESENT PREVENT PLORVANT 
PORTAL PARCEL PARTIAL PENCIL POIRTIAL   
PORCH PERCH POUCH POOCH POLCH   
PEPPER POPPER PORTER POTTER PORPER   
PATCHWORK PITCHFORK PULLCORK POCKETBOOK POTCHBORK 
PIXEL PIXIE VOXEL VIXEN POXEN   
PRODIGAL PORTUGAL PROTOCOL PIVITAL PROTUGAL 
PRINCE PRANCE FRANCE TRANCE PRUNCE   
REWIND REMIND RESCIND REMAND REBIRND   
REFRACTORY RECTORY REFLECTORY REDACTORY REFENCTORY 
RETAIN REMAIN REGAIN REFRAIN REGREIN   
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REWARD RETARD REGARD REWORD RELARD   
REFURBISH RELINQUISH REVARNISH REGARNISH REMANISH 
RECANT REPENT RELENT REMNANT REVANT   
SAVAGERY SURGERY SAVORY SYNERGY SAVORGY   
SMACKS SNACKS STACKS SLACKS SCACKS   
SCONCE SCIENCE SILENCE SALIENCE SCORENCE 
SECURITY SECRETARY SECRETLY SECULARLY SECORITLY 
SHAMROCK SHIPWRECK SHELLSHOCK SHEETROCK SHEMPHOCK 
SHATTERED SPATTERED SHUTTERED SPUTTERED SHETTERED 
SHARK STARK SPARK SHIRK SHONK   
SCOOP SNOOP SCOOT STOOP SHOOP   
SPEAK STREAK SNEAK STEAK SKEAK   
SLIPPER SLIPPED SLOPPED SLAPPED SLARPED   
SULLY GULLY SILLY PULLY SOLLY   
SLOUGH TOUGH ROUGH DOUGH SOUGH   
SHOWER SKEWER SLOWER SHAVER SPAWER   
SPUMONI SPAGHETTI SALAMI SERENGETI SPURGONI 
SWELLS SPELLS SHELLS SMELLS STELLS   
STILL SPILL SKILL STALL STOLL   
STONE STOVE STOKE STOLE STOPE   
STIFF STUFF SNUFF STAFF STURF   
TAUPE TROUP TORTE TROUT TORPE   
TRANSPORT TRANSPLANT TRANSPARENT TRANSVARIANT TRENSORENT 
TEMPER TIMBER TAMPER TIMBRE TUMPER   
WASTE HASTE PASTE TASTE VASTE   
VOGUE ROGUE VAGUE PLAGUE VEIGUE   
VENOUS VENEMOUS VOLUMINOUS VORACIOUS VERAMOUS 
WAGER WAFER WATER WAITER WAIBER   
WEDDED WELDED WADDLED WADED WIDDRED 
WORDS WELDS WOODS WORLDS WONDS   
 
 
